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DRINK, DRIVE, SUE, REPEAT: THE VICIOUS CYCLE CREATED 
BY VOSS V. TRANQUILINO 
Katie Barrett∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Tiffany’s Restaurant in Toms River, New Jersey, appears to be like 
any other sports bar—boasting over twenty flat-screen high-definition 
TVs, constantly slinging their “world famous” wings, and offering a 
generous happy hour from 4–7 p.m. and then again from 10–11 p.m.1 
November 9, 2006, was like any other Monday evening at Tiffany’s, 
drawing a crowd of patrons who wanted to take advantage of happy 
hour specials.  Among the drinkers was Frederick Voss, a 46-year-old 
man who was looking to unwind with a few alcoholic beverages.  But 
upon leaving Tiffany’s, the night took a turn for the worse when Voss 
ran a red light2 and then crashed his motorcycle into a vehicle driven by 
Kristoffe Tranquilino.3  The latter was unharmed, but Voss sustained 
serious personal injuries.4  He was fortunate to survive, for not only was 
he more vulnerable as a motorcyclist, but he was also drunk.5  His blood 
alcohol content was .196 percent—well over twice the legal limit of .08 
percent.6  Following this accident, the law ran its typical course when 
prosecutors charged Voss with driving while intoxicated (DWI), to 
which he pled guilty.7  But then in a bizarre twist of events, Voss—the 
drunk driver—sued Tranquilino (the person he hit) and Tiffany’s 
Restaurant (the establishment that had served him alcohol earlier in the 
evening).8  The trial court dismissed the suit against the injured motorist, 
but allowed the suit against Tiffany’s Restaurant to proceed.9  On 
appeal, the defendant restaurant pointed to a New Jersey statute 
mandating that a driver who is convicted of DWI “shall have no cause 
of action for recovery of economic or noneconomic loss sustained as a 
 
             ∗   Associate Member, 2011–12 University of Cincinnati Law Review. 
 1. TIFFANY’S RESTAURANT, http://www.tiffanysrestaurant.com. (last visited Feb. 26, 2012). 
 2. Interestingly, neither the Superior Court nor the Supreme Court of New Jersey mentioned the 
fact that Voss ran a red light.  This fact was widely reported in other news sources.  Se , e.g., Daniel 
Nee, Court: Brick Man Who Drove Drunk Can Sue Toms River Bar, RICKPATCH (June 2, 2011), 
http://brick.patch.com/articles/court-brick-man-who-drove-drunk-can-sue-toms-river-bar. 
 3. Voss v. Tranquilino, 992 A.2d 829, 831 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
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result of the accident.”10  Despite the plain text of the statute, the 
appellate court allowed Voss to sue Tiffany’s.11  When the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey affirmed this decision, it essentially allowed Voss 
to benefit from drunk driving.12 
The case Voss v. Tranquilino was met with immediate backlash—and 
for a variety of reasons.13  People complained that the decision 
completely eviscerated personal responsibility and unfairly allowed 
people to profit from their crimes.14  Others lamented the hit that the bar 
and restaurant industry would take in the form of increased insurance 
premiums.15  Still others pointed out that the decision would enable 
frivolous lawsuits and increase the perception of a litigious society.16  
Yet perhaps the most obvious criticism was the court’s willingness to 
completely flout on-point legislation.17  Part II of this Casenote 
examines the background of the specific type of law at issue—dram 
shop liability—and also parses out the particular New Jersey statute 
involved.  Part III provides an overview of the case Voss v. Tranquilino 
and briefly explores how other jurisdictions have settled the issue.  Part 
IV analyzes the Voss court’s rationales and ultimately concludes that the 
court’s reasoning was seriously flawed.  Finally, Part V explores the 
consequences of the decision and provides general suggestions for how 
to construct more effective dram shop acts. 
II.  DRAM SHOP LIABILITY BACKGROUND AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
At common law, “a person who sold or gave liquor to an intoxicated 
adult drinker was not liable for subsequent injuries caused by his 
intoxication.”18  Yet as American society changed, becoming 
increasingly mobile and simultaneously less tolerant of irresponsible 
 
 10. Id. (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-4.5(b) (2003)). 
 11. Id. at 831. 
 12. Voss v. Tranquilino, 19 A.3d 470 (N.J. 2011).  The prior citations come from the Superior 
Court, which provided an in-depth analysis of the facts, legal arguments, and legislative history.  Since 
the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court without adding or amending the lower 
court’s rationales, most of this Comment will cite to the Superior Court. 
 13. One of the more memorable images that emerged from the controversy was a cartoon of an 
angel and devil sitting on a troubled man’s shoulders, with the devil encouraging the man, “Have 
another brew!”  The caption reads, “The Devil Made Me Do It!” and then in smaller letters states, “NJ 
Court: it’s the bartender’s fault, no personal responsibility here!”  New Jersey: “The Devil Made Me Do 
It”  . . . High Court Rules Drunk Driver Who Wrecked Can Sue Bar Who Served Him Too Much, DWI 
HIT PARADE! (June 9, 2011), http://www.dwihitparade.com/tag/fredrick-voss/. 
 14. Public Weigh-In on Voss v. Tranquilino, LAWSUIT REFORM WATCH (June 3, 2011), 
http://www.lawsuitreformwatch.org/2011/06/public-weigh-in-on-voss-v-tranquilino.html. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Voss, 19 A.3d at 472 (Albin, J., dissenting). 
 18. VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 359 (12th ed. 2010). 
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drinking and serving practices, legislatures recognized the need to 
amend the common law no-liability rule.19  Thus, the 19th century 
witnessed an onslaught of dram shop acts, or statutes that allowed a civil 
cause of action against any licensed establishment that over-served a 
patron who was thereafter responsible for injury due to his 
intoxication.20  Subpart A explores the general background and history 
of dram shop acts, and Subpart B examines New Jersey’s specific 
statute, which is generally indicative of other states’ dram shop acts. 
A. Background and History 
A “dram” is a small unit of alcohol, usually whiskey or scotch.21  
Thus, “dram shop” was a common term in the 19th century to refer to 
any establishment that sold alcohol for consumption on the premises.22  
This broad definition included bars, restaurants, saloons, taverns, and 
any other licensed vendor.23  Today, the term “dram shop” is generally 
only used in the context of dram shop liability, which was legislatures’ 
way of abrogating common law’s harsh no-recovery rule.24  The 
common law approach reasoned that the drinker’s consumption—not the 
dram shop’s provision—of the intoxicating beverage was the sole and 
proximate cause of any resulting injury and therefore the dram shop 
could not be held liable.25  Where the drinker himself was injured, 
common law’s no-recovery rule was bolstered by basic tort principles 
such as assumption of the risk and contributory negligence.26   
Yet by the mid-1800s, with the Temperance Movement well 
underway, society and legislatures alike came to view dram shops and 
 
 19. Richard Smith, A Comparative Analysis of Dramshop Liability and a Proposal for Uniform 
Legislation, 25 J. CORP. L. 553, 555 (2000). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Dram, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/dram?region=us 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2012). 
 22. BLACK ’ S LAW DICTIONARY 342 (6th ed. 1991). 
 23. See id. 
 24. STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 9:82 (Supp. 2008–09) (“The 
dram shop statute was enacted to provide a recourse in an area where courts had refused to recognize a 
cause of action arising out of the furnishing of intoxicating beverages.”). 
 25. SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 18, at 359.  In some instances, the common law rule of no 
liability was taken to the extreme.  Indeed, one historian found that during the colonial period, dram 
shop owners could be fined for refusing to allow customers to drink as much as they wanted.  BENSON 
BOBRICK, ANGEL IN THE WHIRLWIND  53 (Penguin 1998). 
 26. See Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Liability of Persons Furnishing Intoxicating Liquor for Injury 
to or Death of Consumer, Outside Coverage of Civil Damages Acts, 98 A.L.R. 3d 1230 (1980).  
Contributory negligence, an affirmative defense, arises where the plaintiff’s conduct was “below the 
standard to which he is legally required to conform for his own protection and which is a contributing 
cause” to his injuries.  BLACK ’S LAW DICTIONARY 717 (6th ed. 1991). 
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alcohol in general with disdain.27  Reformers argued that the common 
law no-recovery rule encouraged a culture of excessive drinking, which 
in turn contributed to the deterioration of the family unit and the nation’s 
moral fiber.28  In an effort to avoid this undesirable trajectory, 
legislatures passed the first dram shop acts.29  Reflecting the social goals 
of the Temperance Movement, these early statutes provided causes of 
action for the limited class of spouses and children who were injured in 
person, property, or means of support in connection with negligent 
serving practices.30  Although these types of negligence suits are 
commonplace in today’s society, the first dram shop statutes marked a 
sea change in American jurisprudence because now dram shops had a 
statutorily-created duty to their patrons—a duty that had never before 
existed.31 
States that resisted the initial wave of dram shop acts were again 
confronted with the issue throughout the 1970s and 1980s, when the 
popularity of dram shop acts underwent a wave of resurgence due 
largely to the prevalence of automobiles and the rise in drunk-driving 
related accidents.32  Advocating to abrogate the common law no-liability 
rule, one judge explained, “the basis upon which these [common law] 
cases were decided is sadly eroded by the shift from commingling 
alcohol and horses to commingling alcohol and horsepower.”33  Indeed, 
courts and society alike were quick to recognize a vehicle in the hands 
of an intoxicated individual as “an instrument of danger.”34  Elaborating 
on this theme, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted: 
The person who would put into the hands of an obviously demented 
individual a firearm with which he shot an innocent third person would be 
amenable in damages to that third person for unlawful negligence.  An 
intoxicated person behind the wheel of an automobile can be as 
dangerous as an insane person with a firearm.35 
 
 27. Smith, supra note 19, at 555.  As Smith explained, “the goal of the Temperance Movement 
was, after all, to banish demon rum because it was the nemesis of domestic life.”  Id. at 565. 
 28. These early rationales supporting dram shop liability differ greatly from the rationales of 
today, which argue that the common law rule unfairly insulates commercial establishments from 
liability, thereby allowing establishments to earn a profit from over-serving without fear of being held 
socially and legally accountable. 
 29. Smith, supra note 19, at 555. 
 30. Id. at 555–56. 
 31. See, e.g., Slager v. HWA Corp., 435 N.W.2d 349, 360 (Iowa 1989) (explaining that 
“dram shop statutes were created to fill a void left empty at common law”). 
 32. Smith, supra note 19, at 556. 
 33. Garcia v. Hargrove, 176 N.W.2d 566, 572 (Wis. 1970) (Hallows, C.J., dissenting), overruled 
by Sorensen v. Jarvis, 350 N.W.2d 108 (Wis. 1984). 
 34. Jardine v Upper Darby Lodge No. 1973, 198 A.2d 550, 553 (Pa. 1964). 
 35. Id. 
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Yet like any new legislation, the dram shop acts were riddled with 
uncertainties and inconsistencies.36  Recurring issues sprung up 
involving basic questions such as whether the dram shop acts provided 
the exclusive remedy for the injured individual, whether the acts ought 
to be construed narrowly or liberally, and most importantly for purposes 
of this Casenote, whether or not the intoxicated person himself could 
recover.37  The answer to this latter question necessarily depended on 
the specific statute at issue. 
B. New Jersey’s Dram Shop Act 
New Jersey was one of the later states to codify its dram shop act, 
which it finally enacted in 1987.38  The act, formally called the “New 
Jersey Licensed Alcoholic Beverage Server Fair Liability Act,”39 
provides that it “shall be the exclusive civil remedy for personal injury 
or property damage resulting from the negligent service of alcoholic 
beverages by a licensed alcoholic beverage server.”40  As is typical of 
other dram shop laws, the New Jersey law allows a person who sustains 
personal injury or property damage as a result of the negligent service of 
alcoholic beverages to recover damages from a licensed alcoholic 
beverage server only if the server was negligent, the injury was 
proximately caused by the negligent service of alcoholic beverages, and 
the injury was a foreseeable consequence of the negligent service.41  Th  
legislature took care to define “negligent” as requiring a showing that 
the server served a visibly intoxicated person.42  States have tinkered 
with the definition of “visibly intoxicated,” such as by requiring proof 
that the person was so obviously intoxicated that, at the time of sale, he 
presented a clear danger to others.43 
 
 36. Smith, supra note 19, at 556–57.  Smith argues that dram shop laws of today are largely 
uniform, but this was not the case before the tort reform movement.  Prior to the reform, it was often 
unclear when liability would attach under the dram shop laws.  Compounding the uncertainties, in some 
cases the legislature imposed damage caps or outright returned to the common law rule of no liability. 
 37. For a brief overview of these issues, see generally SPEISER ET AL., supra note 24, § 9:86. 
 38. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:22A-1 (West 1987).  Recognizing the numerous uncertainties in dram 
shop laws discussed supra notes 36 and 37, the legislature proposed, “the incidence of liability should 
be more predictable.  That predictability may be achieved by defining the limits of the civil liability of 
licensed alcoholic beverage servers in order to encourage the development and implementation of risk 
reduction techniques.”  Id. § 2A:22A-2. 
 39. Id. § 2A:22A-1. 
 40. Id. § 2A:22A-4. 
 41. Id. § 2A:22A-5(a). 
 42. Id. § 2A:22A-5(b). 
 43. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-126-104 (2005). 
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III.  FOUR APPROACHES TO APPLYING DRAM SHOP LAWS TO THE 
VOLUNTARILY INTOXICATED INDIVIDUAL  
Justice Brandeis’ vision that the individual states would serve as 
laboratories and “try novel social and economic experiments without 
risk to the rest of the country”44 was especially prophetic in the context 
of dram shop laws.  Indeed, the states have truly resorted to federalist 
principles in an effort to tailor dram shop laws best suited to their 
specific populace.45  The most extensive dram shop laws cover a wide 
variety of issues, including service to minors, social host liability, and 
recovery for noneconomic damages like loss of consortium.46  Despite 
the interesting aspects each of these issues raises, this Casenote focuses 
only on the issue posed in Voss v. Tranquilino; that is, should the driver 
who pleads guilty to driving while intoxicated be able to bring a dram 
shop action against the establishment that served him?  The Voss case 
answered this question affirmatively, and this Part examines each of the 
three rationales the court presented.  In addition, this Part examines state 
supreme court decisions that have arrived at the opposite conclusion.  
This Part will also provide a brief overview of jurisdictions that have 
provided an intermediate option and those that have denied recovery 
entirely—regardless of the plaintiff’s level of intoxication. 
A. Allowing the Voluntarily Intoxicated Individual to Bring a Dram 
Shop Action: New Jersey’s Voss v. Tranquilino 
In Voss, had New Jersey’s Dram Shop Act been the only relevant 
legislation, the court’s determination that the drunk driver could recover 
from the bar would be well-founded.47  This is due to the fact that the 
Dram Shop Act, as written in 1987, did not specifically limit recovery to 
third parties only.48  In defining a person who may recover under the 
statute, the legislature was extremely broad, allowing the definition to 
include, “a natural person, the estate of a natural person, an association 
of natural persons, or an association, trust company, partnership, 
 
 44. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 45. The expansive differences among state statutes have led one commentator to dub this field of 
law, “a bewildering chiaroscuro.  Any attempt at a sweeping generality would be totally unwarranted.” 
SPEISER ET AL., supra note 24, § 9:86. 
 46. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 28-A, § 2504 (1987) (which covers various issues not limited to 
who may bring suit, definitions of negligent and reckless service, damages, limits on damages, and 
common law defenses). 
 47. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:22A-1-7 (1987).  On its face, the statute says nothing about 
barring a voluntarily intoxicated patron from bringing an action against the establishment that over-
served him. 
 48. Voss v. Tranquilino, 992 A.2d 829, 834 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (finding that “dram 
shop claims by drunk drivers are . . . encompassed by the plain terms of the Dram Shop Act”). 
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corporation, organization, or the manager, agent, servant, officer or 
employee of any of them.”49  The legislature could have defined person 
to refer to the person of another (thereby making clear that only third 
parties could recover), but it failed to do so.  Thus, had the Voss court 
been confronted with this statute only, the decision allowing Voss to 
recover would be disturbing to some, but logically sound. 
However, legislation does not exist in a vacuum; it must co-exist with 
other related statutes.50  In Voss, this meant that the New Jersey 
Supreme Court had to read the Dram Shop Act alongside N.J.S.A 
39:6A-4.5(b).51  Enacted ten years after the state’s Dram Shop Act, this 
statute provided that a driver who is convicted of or pleads guilty to 
driving a vehicle while intoxicated52 “shall have no cause of action for 
recovery of economic or noneconomic loss sustained as a result of the 
accident.”53  The language used here could not be more explicit: the 
legislature used the command “shall” instead of the more permissive 
“may.”54  Thus, reading this statute with the Dram Shop Act, it appears 
as though N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(b) was intended to prohibit drunk drivers 
from recovering under the Dram Shop Act.55  Even the Voss court 
conceded, “a literal reading of the statute suggests that all claims 
[brought by a drunk driver] are barred . . . .”56  Despite this admission, 
the Voss court “reach[ed] a contrary conclusion.”57 
The appellate court’s analysis first delved into the legislative history 
surrounding the earlier of the two relevant statutes, the Dram Shop 
Act.58  As originally written, the act contained a provision that expressly 
stated, “[a] person who becomes intoxicated and sustains personal injury 
or property damage as a result of his actions while intoxicated shall be 
prohibited from instituting a civil action for damages against a licensed 
 
 49. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:22A-3 (1987). 
 50. See, e.g., In re DeMarco, 414 A.2d 1339, 1345 (N.J. 1980) (where the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey stated that examining a statute “includes not simply the language of the provision itself, but 
related provisions as well, and especially the reality to which the provision is to be applied”).  The 
United States Supreme Court has also endorsed this rule of statutory construction.  See, e.g., Shalala v. 
Guernsey Memorial Hosp., 514 U.S. 87 (1995). 
 51. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-4.5(b) (2003). 
 52. New Jersey’s DWI provision is codified in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50 (2010). 
 53. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-4.5(b) (2003). 
 54. See, e.g., Harvey v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Essex Cnty., 153 A.2d 10, 16 (N.J. 1959) 
(where the Supreme Court of New Jersey stated, “the word ‘may’ is ordinarily permissive or directory, 
and the words ‘must’ and ‘shall’ are generally mandatory”). 
 55. See, e.g., Caviglia v. Royal Tours of Am., 842 A.2d 125, 133 (N.J. 2004).  Here, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court cited to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(b) when it stated, “a motorist may not pursue a 
personal injury action if he was intoxicated at the time of the accident.” 
 56. Voss v. Tranquilino, 992 A.2d 829, 831 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 832–33. 
7
Barrett: Drink, Drive, Sue, Repeat: The Vicious Cycle Created by Voss v. T
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2013
1008 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 81 
alcoholic beverage server.”59  The court went on to explain that then-
Governor Kean objected to this provision, finding that it eviscerated the 
licensed server’s duty to patrons.60  Complying with the Governor’s 
conditional veto, the legislature deleted the provision.61  In light of this 
history, the Voss court correctly pointed out that the original Dram Shop 
Act was intended to allow the drunk driver himself to recover.62 
After exploring the history and applicability of the original Dram 
Shop Act, the appellate court had to decide its first conclusion of law: 
whether the legislation that came ten years later, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(b), 
barred drunk drivers from bringing Dram Shop Act claims.63  Turning 
again to the legislative history, the court noted that N.J.S.A. 39:6A-
4.5(b) was part of a larger legislative effort to reduce automobile 
insurance premiums.64  Specifically, “the Act was designed to address 
‘various aspects concerning enforcement against insurance 
fraud . . . .’”65  The legislature’s theory was that by reducing the 
instances of insurance fraud, automobile insurance premiums would also 
fall, thereby saving New Jersey drivers $150 million per year in rate 
increases.66  Although one does not typically associate drunk driving 
with insurance fraud, the legislature reasoned that prohibiting drunk 
drivers from recovering economic or noneconomic losses fits into the 
larger scheme of reducing insurance premiums.67  Because of the 
insurance-based focus of N.J.S.A 39:6A-4.5(b), the Voss court 
determined that the statute’s scope should be limited as such.68  Had the 
legislature intended the insurance premium legislation to amend the 
Dram Shop Act as a secondary purpose, this intent would have been 
apparent from the legislative history.69  Yet because the legislative 
history revealed no such intent, the Voss court declined to amend 
 
 59. Id. at 833. 
 60. Id. at 834. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id.  The court’s reasoning follows a principle of statutory construction referred to as 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, meaning the expression of one thing is the exclusion of others.  
BLACK ’ S LAW DICTIONARY 403 (6th ed. 1991).  Since the statute specifically outlined when a person 
was prohibited from recovering, only those situations would bar recovery.  Other factual situations, not 
contemplated by the statute, would not prevent one from recovering. 
 63. Voss, 992 A.2d at 834. 
 64. Id. at 835. 
 65. Camp v. Lummino, 800 A.2d 234, 236 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (quoting the 
statement to the bill (S.2223)). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id.  The court explained that the statute is “related to the ongoing endeavor in this State to 
reduce automobile insurance fraud and the cost of automobile insurance.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Use of 
the word “and” suggests the statute was not limited to targeting insurance fraud exclusively. 
 68. Voss v. Tranquilino, 992 A.2d 829, 831 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010). 
 69. Id. at 835 (“We find no evidence of legislative intent in the enactment of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-
4.5(b) to undo a major aspect of the Dram Shop Act.”). 
8
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judicially what the legislature had failed to amend explicitly.70 
This latter point regarding the court’s proper role in the scheme of 
checks and balances bleeds into the court’s next argument regarding 
statutory construction.  The opinion operates under the tacit 
acknowledgement that the judiciary is the “honest agent” 71 of the 
legislature; that is, the judiciary carries out the laws—it generally does 
not make or abolish them.72  For this reason, courts are reluctant to 
repeal legislation by implication.73  The hesitancy derives from the 
assumption that if lawmakers intended to repeal a statute, they would do 
so explicitly instead of waiting for courts to notice and interpret the 
implied repealer.74  Judicially-mandated implied repealers also run a 
high risk of mistake: the legislature may not have intended the law to be 
repealed, believing instead that the law was compatible with other 
laws.75  Noting these dangers and the general disruption to the overall 
governmental system, the Voss court explained that implied repealers 
“require clear and compelling evidence of the legislative intent, and 
such intent must be free from reasonable doubt.”76  Imposing the 
reasonable doubt standard—the highest standard afforded in the judicial 
system—bars almost all implied repealers—the Voss case was no 
different.  The court scoured the legislative history, record of the 
testimony, and appendices of the public hearing on the bill, but to no 
avail.77  The search failed to yield any reference to amending New 
Jersey’s Dram Shop Act, thereby precluding the argument of repeal by 
implication.78 
The last argument in the Voss court’s trifecta rationale was perhaps 
the most surprising: public policy considerations.79  Admittedly, the 
average person does not consider allowing a drunk driver to profit from 
his criminal activity as a pressing public issue (or an area of concern at 
 
 70. Id. 
 71. Karen Petroski, Comment, Retheorizing the Presumption Against Implied Repeals, 92 CALIF . 
L. REV. 487, 491 (2004). 
 72. Voss, 992 A.2d at 834–35. 
 73. Id. at 835 (“[T]here is a strong presumption against implied repealers and every reasonable 
construction should be applied to avoid them.”). 
 74. See, e.g., Petroski, supra note 71, at 489 (“[T]he presumption against implied 
repeals . . . embodies a policy of hostility to the notion of statutory updating unless the legislature makes 
that updating explicit.”). 
 75. Id. at 492 (explaining that the presumption against implied repealers “proposes that 
legislatures neither (1) intend to create inconsistencies in the statutory scheme nor (2) intend their 
enactments to have unforeseen effects on other parts of the statutory scheme.”). 
 76. Voss, 992 A.2d at 834 (quoting Twp. Of Mahwah v. Bergen Cnty. Bd. of Taxation, 486 A.2d 
818 (N.J. 1985)). 
 77. Id. at 835. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 836. 
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all, for that matter), but the Voss court’s understanding of public policy 
was not so limited as considering only the drunk driver’s ability to 
recover.  Instead, the court broadened the parameters and considered the 
responsibility of the serving establishments.80  Barring Voss from 
recovering from the restaurant that negligently over-served him would 
be the equivalent of “immunizing liquor licensees from liability.”81  
Such a policy, the court explained, “would be inimical to the policy of 
this State of curbing drunk driving.”82  Thus, the court’s reasoning 
recognized that reducing the incidents of drunk driving is necessarily 
related to placing some responsibility on the serving establishment, 
which possesses the expertise related to proper serving practices.83 
B. The Majority Approach: Reserving Dram Shop Actions for Third 
Parties 
Although not the first decision of its kind,84 Voss v. Tranquilino is an 
anomaly in an age where the modern trend in most jurisdictions is to bar 
the drunk driver from bringing suit against the establishment that served 
him.85  Some states have this approach explicitly spelled out by statute.  
For example, Colorado law provides: “No civil action may be brought 
pursuant to this subsection . . . by the person to whom the alcohol 
beverage was sold or served or by his or her estate, legal guardian, or 
dependent.”86  Idaho goes one step further, barring from recovery the 
intoxicated individual and his estate as well as any passenger in a 
vehicle driven by the intoxicated individual.87 
In other jurisdictions, the dram shop acts are not as clear, thereby 
leaving state courts of last resort to decide the issue.  In Klever v. 
Canton Sachsenheim, the Supreme Court of Ohio was asked to interpret 
 
 80. Id.  The decision to hold the driver or the serving establishment liable raises a chicken-or-egg 
problem, since holding the establishment liable does not deter one from drinking ex ante.  Yet the 
counterargument is that ex post dram shop liability will encourage responsible serving techniques to 
those who are going to drink anyway.  This argument was discussed by the Supreme Court of Ohio in 
Smith v. 10th Inning, Inc., 551 N.E.2d 1296 (Ohio 1990). 
 81. Voss, 992 A.2d at 831. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 836. 
 84. See, e.g., Smith v. Sewell, 858 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. 1993) (holding that an individual who is 
provided, sold, or served alcoholic beverages in violation of the Alcoholic Beverage Code and injures 
himself may assert a cause of action against the provider).  S e also IND. CODE § 7.1-5-10-15.5 (1996) 
(specifically granting recovery to a person whose death or injury is caused by his voluntary intoxication 
if certain conditions are met). 
 85. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 19, at 563–64 (“[T]he clear majority rule among states that 
recognize dramshop actions is that an adult customer may not recover from a negligent dramshop for 
injuries caused by the customer’s own intoxication.”). 
 86. COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-47-801(3)(b) (2007). 
 87. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 23-808(4)(a)(b) (1986). 
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O.R.C. § 4399.18, entitled, “[l]iability for acts of intoxicated person.”88  
The statute provided that “a person” has a cause of action against the 
serving establishment for damage “caused by the negligent actions of an 
intoxicated person . . . .”89  The unfortunate facts of the case involved a 
19-year-old motorist who was killed in a single-car accident after he had 
been drinking at a wedding reception.90  The decedent’s mother brought 
an action against the club hosting the reception, but the Supreme Court 
of Ohio held that no cause of action existed.91  As the court explained, 
“the phrasing and structure of R.C. 4399.18 do not countenance a 
reading that allows the contemplated ‘intoxicated person’ (the person 
causing the injury) to be one and the same with the contemplated injured 
‘person’ (the person with the authorized cause of action).”92 
Besides relying on statutory construction, the Supreme Court of Ohio 
justified its decision by using one of the same rationales the Voss court 
applied, although to reach a completely contrary result.  Both courts 
claimed that their decision was supported by basic public policy 
considerations, yet the Klever court understood these considerations as 
intended to protect third parties, not the drinker himself.93  Thus, like 
other statutorily-defined duties that create no duty of conduct toward the 
plaintiff, “the evident policy of the legislature is to protect only a limited 
class of individuals.”94  The court further justified this approach by 
explaining that because dram shop acts abrogate the common law, they 
must be narrowly construed.95 
Interestingly, the Supreme Court of Ohio denied recovery even 
though the intoxicated individual was an underage adult.96  
Traditionally, minors were the exception to the rule that a voluntarily 
intoxicated individual could not recover against the establishment that 
served him.97  Dram shop laws afforded minors this added protection 
under the theory that their youth and inexperience prevented them from 
 
 88. Klever v. Canton Sachsenheim, Inc., 715 N.E.2d 536 (Ohio 1999). 
 89. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4399.18 (West 2004). 
 90. Klever, 715 N.E.2d at 537. 
 91. Id. at 538.  The court’s decision reaffirmed the approach that the lower courts had already 
been applying.  See, e.g., Kemock v. Mark II, 404 N.E.2d 766 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978); Tome v. Berea 
Pewter Bug, Inc., 446 N.E.2d 848 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982) (both denying the intoxicated person or his 
estate from recovering). 
 92. Klever, 715 N.E.2d at 538–39. 
 93. Id. at 539. 
 94. Id. (quoting WILLIAM LLOYD PROSSER ET AL., PROSSER &  KEETON ON TORTS § 36 (5th ed. 
1984)). 
 95. Id. at 538. 
 96. Id.  The court referred to the decedent as “an underage adult” instead of a “minor” because 
he had attained the age of majority (18), but not the legal drinking age (21). 
 97. Smith, supra note 19, at 564. 
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understanding the debilitating effects of alcohol.98  Despite this 
rationale, the Supreme Court of Ohio departed from the special standard, 
concluding, “an underage adult who is served alcohol by a liquor permit 
holder is legally indistinguishable from [any other] adult.”99  Even 
though the court’s position seemed to defy the trend to protect minors, 
the court cited to several other jurisdictions that similarly decided to bar 
minors and underage adults from recovering against the establishments 
that illegally served them.100  These decisions reveal that jurisdictions 
are increasingly moving toward zero-tolerance policies with respect to 
self-inflicted intoxication followed by injuries.101  The fact that the 
drinker is underage is irrelevant in jurisdictions that view blamelessness 
as a perquisite to recovery in any judicial proceeding. 
C. An Intermediate Approach 
Besides the diametrically opposed approaches of the Supreme Courts 
of New Jersey and Ohio, some courts have applied an intermediate 
approach.  This compromise does not allow a surviving drunk driver to 
bring suit against the serving establishment, but in the case of death, the 
decedent’s family may recover for loss of support.102  In Jones v. Fisher, 
a widow brought suit against the driver who hit and killed her husband, 
an intoxicated pedestrian.103  Pursuant to Minnesota’s dram shop act, the 
widow also sued the American Legion and VFW bars that had served 
her husband.104  The bars argued that because Minnesota law barred a 
voluntarily intoxicated individual from bringing a dram shop action, the 
spouse of a voluntarily intoxicated decedent should similarly be barred 
from bringing such an action.105  The Supreme Court of Minnesota 
disagreed: “Although one who voluntarily becomes intoxicated cannot 
recover for his own injury under the Dram Shop Act, a spouse may 
recover for loss of support under that act notwithstanding the injured 
party’s or decedent’s voluntary intoxication.”106  The court explained its 
 
 98. Id. (explaining that whereas an able-bodied adult is assumed to understand the risk that 
voluntary-intoxication poses, “Congress and the state legislatures have already made the judgment that 
minors are incompetent to make decisions about their alcohol consumption”). 
 99. Klever, 715 N.E.2d at 538. 
 100. Id. at 539. 
 101. The Supreme Court of Ohio cited to LaGuire v. Kain, 487 N.W.2d 389 (Mich. 1992); 
Nutting v. Zieser, 482 N.W.2d 424 (Iowa 1992); Randall v. Excelsior, 103 N.W.2d 131 (Minn. 1960). 
 102. See Jones v. Fisher, 309 N.W.2d 726 (Minn. 1981). 
 103. Id. at 727. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 729. 
 106. Id. at 728 (internal citations omitted). 
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rationale by equating the spouse to an “innocent third party.”107  
Framing the issue this way precluded the interpretation that the drinker 
was benefiting from his own drunkenness.  This intermediate approach 
allows a broader class of individuals to recover under a dram shop 
action, but still requires the individual to meet a minimum threshold of 
third party innocence.108 
D. Jurisdictions that Refuse to Pass Dram Shop Acts 
Finally, a few jurisdictions have resisted enacting any type of dram 
shop act at all.109  These few states can generally be divided into two 
categories.  The first consists of those that continue to follow the 
common law rule of no-recovery whatsoever.  Williamson v. Old 
Brogue, Inc. involved allegations that bartenders at The Old Brogue 
served “prodigious quantities of alcohol” to a patron who then drove his 
vehicle across the centerline, colliding head-on with the plaintiff’s 
vehicle.110  In the ensuing litigation, the plaintiff argued that even 
though the General Assembly of Virginia had not adopted any type of 
dram shop legislation, the principles of such an action were rooted in 
Virginia common law, thus creating a cause of action.111  Additionally, 
the plaintiff argued that since selling alcohol to a visibly intoxicated 
individual constituted a misdemeanor, this fact gave rise to a claim of 
negligence per se.112  The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected both 
arguments.113  Regarding the common law claim, the court reminded the 
plaintiff that at common law, non-liability was the norm.114  Thus, until 
the legislature deliberately amends the common law approach, the court 
stated that it would continue to employ principles of non-liability.115  
 
 107. Id. at 729.  The court’s repeated use of the phrase “innocent third party” might be understood 
as a preemptive rebuttal were the defendant to raise the defense of the non-innocent party doctrine.  
Applying this doctrine, courts have barred from recovery the intoxicated person as well as those who 
contribute to or encourage his intoxication.  Non-innocent conduct can be as innocuous as buying a 
round for the intoxicated individual.  See, e.g., Goss v. Richmond, 381 N.W.2d 776 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1985). 
 108. Id. at 728–29 (again referring to Mrs. Jones as an “innocent third party”). 
 109. See, e.g., Shea v. Matassa, 918 A.2d 1090 (Del. 2007); Ono v. Applegate, 612 P.2d 533 
(Haw. 1980) (but allowing common law dram shop actions); Ling v. Jan’s Liquors, 703 P.2d 731 (Kan. 
1985); Felder v. Butler, 438 A.2d 494 (Md. 1981); Pelzek v. Am. Legion, 463 N.W.2d 321(Neb. 1990); 
Rodriguez v. Primadonna Co., LLC, 216 P.3d 793 (Nev. 2009); S.D. CO IFIED LAWS § 35-11-1 (1985); 
Williamson v. Old Brogue, Inc., 350 S.E.2d 621, 622 (Va. 1986); Estate of Kelly ex rel. Kelly v. Falin, 
896 P.2d 1245 (Wash. 1995) (en banc). 
 110. Williamson, 350 S.E.2d at 622. 
 111. Id. at 623. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. (“The courts in Virginia operate under a statutory mandate which provides that the 
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Regarding the negligence per se argument, the court found that this 
argument only has force if the plaintiff is within the class that the statute 
was intended to protect.116  Because the misdemeanor of serving a 
visibly intoxicated person was meant to promote individual moderation, 
the third party was not within the class to be protected and therefore 
could not recover under this theory either.117  The Virginia approach 
initially appears unfairly harsh to innocent third parties, but these parties 
are not without a remedy.  They can—as was the case in Old Brogue—
sue the drunk driver himself, though this solution presupposes that the 
driver is solvent. 
The second category of jurisdictions that lack dram shop actions still 
allows recovery under normal negligence principles.  Hawaii is 
representative of this approach, refusing to pass dram shop legislation, 
but nonetheless allowing third parties to recover from the establishment 
in certain circumstances.118  Explaining the rationale for changing its 
approach, the Supreme Court of Hawaii stated that it was “persuaded by 
public policy reflecting a clear judicial trend across the nation to allow 
such a cause of action.”119  Thus, the court held that Hawaii’s liquor 
control statute created a duty on establishments not to serve an 
intoxicated person.120  Violation of the statute could then be submitted to 
the jury as evidence of negligence.121  In subsequent cases, the Supreme 
Court of Hawaii clarified that the privilege of a common law dram shop 
action is not afforded to self-induced intoxication.122 
IV.  VOSS V. TRANQUILINO: BAD LAW AND WORSE PUBLIC POLICY 
As the foregoing Part reveals, the field of dram shop liability provides 
an ample opportunity for states to experiment with different laws that 
are attuned to the special needs of the specific citizenry.  In the course of 
the experimentation process, it becomes clear that some approaches are 
better than others.  This Part argues that the Voss approach is an 
aberration in traditional dram shop liability and should not be followed 
 
common law of England, if not repugnant to the principles of the Bill of Rights or the Virginia 
Constitution, continues in full force and effect within the State, and shall ‘be the rule of decision, except 
as altered by the General Assembly.’”). 
 116. Id. at 624. 
 117. Id. at 625. 
 118. See, e.g., Ono v. Applegate, 612 P.2d 533 (Haw. 1980). 
 119. Winters v. Silver Fox Bar, 797 P.2d 51, 52 (Haw. 1990). 
 120. Ono, 612 P.2d at 539. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Winters, 797 P.2d at 52–53.  In Klever v. Canton Sachsenheim, Inc., 715 N.E.2d 536, 540 
(Ohio 1999), the Supreme Court of Ohio cited to Winters to support the proposition that voluntarily 
intoxicated individuals should not be able to recover for self-inflicted injuries—whether or not the 
jurisdiction has a dram shop act. 
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by other states due to its fundamentally unsound rationales and glaring 
logic gaps.  This Part explores in turn each of the court’s three 
arguments. 
A. Inadequate Insurance Premiums Argument 
The Voss court conclusively determined that the purpose of enacting 
the legislation containing N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(b) was to bring down 
automobile insurance premiums.123  The court described the laborious 
endeavor it undertook to support this assertion: analyzing the legislative 
history, reviewing the complete record of the testimony and appendices 
of the public hearing on the bill, and unearthing prior drafts of the 
legislation.124  Amidst these various means of legislative interpretation, 
the court failed to implement two of the most obvious tools: the text 
itself and common sense. 
The starting point for any statutory interpretation is the plain language 
of the statute itself.125  Had the Voss court focused more on the text of 
the specific statute, instead of the history surrounding the larger 
legislative effort of Chapter 6A, the court would have realized that 
N.J.S.A 39:6A-4.5(b) only marginally affects insurance premiums.126  
The statute provides that a driver of a motor vehicle who is convicted of 
or pleads guilty to driving while intoxicated in connection with an 
accident “shall have no cause of action for recovery of economic or 
noneconomic loss sustained as a result of the accident.”127  On its face, 
this provision has nothing to do with insurance premiums.128  After all, 
New Jersey insurance premiums were skyrocketing due to the 
prevalence of insurance fraud, not due to the number of drunk driving 
accidents.129  There is an argument that barring drunk drivers from 
recovery may reduce the total number of insurance claims and thereby 
contribute to lower insurance premiums, but this argument is attenuated 
at best and overlooks the targeted subjects of the provision.  Indeed, the 
provision applies exclusively to drunk drivers without regard to their 
 
 123. Voss v. Tranquilino, 992 A.2d 829, 835 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010). 
 124. See id. 
 125. Patel v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm’n, 982 A.2d 445, 448 (N.J. 2009). 
 126. See, e.g., Craig J. Casey, 19 Reasons Why Car Insurance Premiums Increase, 4 CAR INS. 
QUOTES, http://www.4carinsurancequotes.com/premium-increases.htm (last visited Apr. 23, 2012).  Of 
the numerous listed reasons, the majority involve non-liability and non-criminal incidents, such as 
turning 50 years old, adding a minor to the policy, or moving to a high-risk area.  A handful of reasons 
cite car accidents and law violations as contributing factors, but none directly identifies drunk driving as 
a source of statewide increases in premiums. 
 127. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-4.5(b) (2003). 
 128. See id. 
 129. Camp v. Lummino, 800 A.2d 234, 236 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002). 
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insurance coverage.130  As the dissent pointed out, “It makes no 
difference whether the drunk driver has liability insurance to the highest 
possible limits.”131  Thus, since the provision identifies a specific class 
of law-breakers and applies indiscriminately to that class, N.J.S.A 
39:6A-4.5(b) is best understood as targeted legislation that serves the 
primary purpose of advancing the social policy of deterring drunk 
driving.132 
As the Voss dissent explains, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(b) accomplishes its 
social agenda by barring a drunk driver from suing another person or 
entity for any loss resulting from the accident—even if the drunk driver 
was not at fault.133  Thus, if a drunk driver is rear-ended by a garbage 
truck while waiting patiently at a red light, the statute prohibits the 
drunk driver from recovering.134  The effect is obvious: by prohibiting 
any reimbursement, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(b) functions as a strong 
disincentive to drink and drive—regardless of whether or not the driver 
has liability insurance.135  In this way, the specific provision only 
marginally serves the purpose of reducing insurance premiums and is 
better characterized as a codification of the societal disapproval of drunk 
driving.136 
B. Posing a Problem for Statutory Interpretation 
While masquerading as a judicial effort to loyally adhere to 
legislative intent, the Voss decision completely flouted the legislature’s 
will and improperly delved into an area outside the province of the 
courts.  These unorthodox tactics will have a disturbing effect for 
statutory interpretation because now no statute—no matter how plainly 
written—will be free from judicial second-guessing and rewriting. 
The Voss court conceded, “[A] literal reading of the statute suggests 
that all claims [brought by a drunk driver] are barred.”137  Indeed, the 
plain language of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(b) provides that a driver convicted 
of DWI “shall have no cause of action for recovery.”138  Due to this 
 
 130. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-4.5(b). 
 131. Voss v. Tranquilino, 19 A.3d 470, 473 (N.J. 2011) (Albin, J., dissenting). 
 132. Id.  The dissent cited to Caviglia v. Royal Tours of Am., 842 A.2d 125 (N.J. 2004), where the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey had previously found that the undergirding of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(b) “is 
to deter drunk driving.”  The majority failed to analyze this case. 
 133. Voss, 19 A.3d at 473. 
 134. Id. at 474–75. 
 135. Id. at 473. 
 136. In an age of legislative bundling, the practice of including seemingly unrelated provisions in 
one bill is not uncommon. 
 137. Voss, 19 A.3d at 474. 
 138. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-4.5(b) (2003) (emphasis added). 
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unambiguous language, the Voss court did not even need to consider the 
argument that N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(b) repealed the earlier Dram Shop Act 
by implication.  Instead, the court should have found that the Dram Shop 
Act—as relating to drunk drivers—was repealed explicitly.  Upon this 
realization, the court’s analysis should have ceased—it did not even 
need to delve into the murky waters of legislative history or speculate as 
to the actual intent of the legislature.  The dissent elaborated on this 
cardinal rule of statutory construction: “We cannot, and should not, 
‘rewrite a plainly-written enactment of the Legislature’ or ‘write an 
additional qualification which the Legislature pointedly omitted.’”139  
The approach of deferring to the text itself when clearly written is more 
plausible than the court’s contention that “even apparently plain words 
must be read in context.”140  Here, a literal reading of the statute was 
possible, and thus the court had a duty to give effect to that literal 
interpretation.  To do otherwise elevates the judiciary over the 
legislature, thereby defying the scheme of co-equal branches of 
government. 
Indeed, when the judiciary begins to question the wisdom of a given 
piece of legislation, the delicate separation of powers system descends 
into grave peril.  Whereas the Voss majority relied on a similar argument 
to avoid repealing legislation by implication, the Voss dissent 
employed—more convincingly—this checks and balances argument to 
support the conclusion that N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(b) barred Voss from 
bringing a dram shop action.  Since the language was “clear and 
unambiguous,” the court’s only duty was to give effect to the 
legislation.141  This is true “however imperfect or misguided the statute 
may seem to the majority as written.”142  Such is the foundational nature 
of our system of governance: the legislature writes the laws and the 
judiciary interprets them.  Yet the majority in Voss defied this tested 
method by rewriting an unambiguous statute “under the dubious 
assumption that the Legislature did not mean what it said.”143  The Voss 
court had the audacity to speculate, “a literal reading [of N.J.S.A 39:6A-
4.5(b)] would be contrary to the meaning intended by the legislature.”144  
This second-guessing approach to statutory construction is problematic 
for several reasons, including the fact that it assumes that the 
legislature—whose task it is to write the laws—suffers from an inability 
 
 139. Voss, 19 A.3d at 474 (N.J. 2011) (Albin, J., dissenting) (quoting Mazzacano v. Estate of 
Kinnerman, 962 A.2d 1103 (N.J. 2009)). 
 140. Voss v. Tranquilino, 992 A.2d 829, 836 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010). 
 141. Voss, 19 A.3d at 472 (Albin, J., dissenting). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Voss, 992 A.2d at 836. 
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to articulate its intent.  Only through the patient interpretation of the 
benevolent judiciary can the legislature’s true intent be discerned.  Such 
an approach ignores the fact that the three branches of government are 
equal and the judiciary was not intended to lord over the legislature and 
rewrite facially unambiguous legislation.  Yet this is the very effect of 
the Voss decision. 
Another problem with the Voss approach is that it overlooks the rule 
in statutory construction that the legislature is assumed to have 
knowledge of all previously enacted legislation.145  Accordingly, the 
legislature that enacted N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(b) is presumed to know of 
and understand the effects on the earlier dram shop legislation.146  Under 
this line of reasoning, the legislature is assumed to know that it was 
altering the entire Dram Shop Act: “if the legislature intended to carve 
out cases arising under the Dram Shop Act, it knew how to do so.”147  
This is the obvious counterargument to the majority’s assertion that 
since N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(b) failed to mention how it changed the Dram 
Shop Act, it must not have been intended to have such an effect.  The 
majority’s argument also loses force when one considers that 
N.J.S.A 39:6A-4.5(b) came only ten years after enactment of the Dram 
Shop Act.  No doubt many of the same legislators who passed the Dram 
Shop Act were still in the General Assembly or Senate when they voted 
on N.J.S.A 39:6A-4.5(b).  Thus, the closeness in time, combined with 
the presumption that legislators are aware of previously-enacted bills, 
lead to the conclusion that the Voss dissent advanced the better 
argument in finding that N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(b) was clearly meant to 
repeal the Dram Shop Act as it relates to drunk drivers. 
Perhaps the most unsettling aspect of the Voss court’s approach to 
statutory construction is that it marks the judiciary’s systematic 
willingness to blatantly disregard the plain text of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-
4.5(b).148  In Camp v. Lummino, the underage plaintiff—just like Voss—
pled guilty to driving while intoxicated, but still proceeded to bring suit 
against the social hosts that had served him after he was injured in a 
single-vehicle accident.149  Rather than citing to the text of N.J.S.A. 
39:6A-4.5(b) and dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint, the Superior 
Court allowed the suit to go forward, explaining that the legislative 
 
 145. See, e.g., State v. Federanko, 139 A.2d 30, 36 (N.J. 1958) (“[T]he Legislature is presumed to 
be familiar with its own enactments, with judicial declarations relating to them, and to have passed or 
preserved cognate laws with the intention that they be construed to serve a useful and consistent 
purpose.”). 
 146. Voss, 19 A.3d at 474 (Albin, J., dissenting). 
 147. Id. 
 148. See, e.g., Camp v. Lummino, 800 A.2d 234 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002); Walcott v. 
Allstate N.J. Ins. Co., 870 A.2d 691 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005). 
 149. Camp, 800 A.2d at 416. 
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history surrounding the statute “cannot be understood to affect the right 
of a driver who is under the legal drinking age.”150  Similarly, in 
Walcott, a plaintiff who had pled guilty to driving while intoxicated 
brought an action against her insurance company after it refused to 
cover her medical expenses amounting to $33,472.17.151  The insurance 
company argued that since the plaintiff had pled guilty to DWI, she was 
ineligible to receive any compensation under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(b).152  
As in Camp, the Walcott court found “no basis in the statutory scheme 
or legislative history to apply Section 4.5’s bar to the recovery by drunk 
drivers of economic and non-economic losses to PIP [personal injury 
protection] benefits as well.”153  In the wake of Camp, Walcott, and Voss 
I, one commentator noted, “it became questionable whether Section 
4.5(b) would ever be an effective defense to bar liability in any context 
outside of the motor vehicle arena.”154  This question was definitely 
answered in the negative after the Supreme Court of New Jersey 
affirmed the lower court’s decision in Voss155 even though the plain text 
of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(b) does not limit its application to the motor 
vehicle arena, but explicitly says the drunk driver shall have “no” cause 
of action.156 
By declining to follow the plain text of the statute, the Voss decision 
creates an uncertain future for cases involving any amount of statutory 
interpretation.  Now, even if the statute is clear on its face, courts will be 
able to cite Voss and claim that “a literal reading [of the statute] would 
be contrary to the meaning intended by the Legislature.”157  Such an 
approach defies common sense, creates a world of unpredictability, and 
bestows upon the judiciary undeserved power at the expense of the 
legislature. 
C. Distorting Public Policy 
The Voss court lauded its decision as one “bolstered by a public 
policy consideration” of discouraging drunk driving.158  Indeed, in 
recent years, the issue has garnered increased attention as powerful 
lobbying groups like Mothers Against Drunk Driving have raised 
 
 150. Id. at 418. 
 151. Walcott, 870 A.2d at 692. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 695. 
 154. Robert A. Diehl, N.J. Court to Mull Drunken Drivers’ Standing to Bring Dram Shop Claims, 
N.J. L. J., Feb. 7, 2011, at 2. 
 155. Voss v. Tranquilino, 19 A.3d 470 (N.J. 2011). 
 156. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-4.5(b) (2003). 
 157. Voss v. Tranquilino, 992 A.2d 829, 836 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010). 
 158. Id. 
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awareness, funds, and votes to strengthen drunk driving laws.159  In this 
way, the important social consideration of reducing drunk driving is not 
being questioned; the debate centers around the best way to go about 
this goal.  The Voss court misunderstood that between a voluntarily 
intoxicated individual and the establishment that served that individual, 
society prefers that the individual pay, not get paid. 
Indeed, Voss essentially allows drunk drivers to profit from their own 
wrongdoing.  As the defendant Tiffany’s Restaurant tried to argue, 
limiting dram shop claims to third parties (and thus making the cause of 
action inapplicable to drunk drivers) would send a firm message to all 
drivers in the state that drunk driving will not be tolerated or 
profitable.160  However, the court rejected this argument, explaining, 
“the Legislature could not have intended to relieve those responsible for 
the intoxication of the drivers.”161  This especially holds true, the court 
reasoned, since the serving establishments “possess the expertise and the 
statutory and regulatory responsibility to avoid serving visibly 
intoxicated patrons.”162  If this were society’s true sentiments, however, 
the Voss decision would not have been met with an overwhelming 
amount of backlash from citizens and the legislature alike. 
A random sampling of online comments posted immediately after the 
Voss decision range from funny to thought-provoking to genuine 
concern for the future of this country, but in all of the comments, the 
theme is the same: the Voss decision just doesn’t make sense.163  One 
commentator offered the obvious concern, “Idiots in THIS state will 
start driving drunk on purpose hoping to get rich when they sue the bar 
after.”164  Another pondered, “[D]o we need to go back to prohibation 
[sic] because humans no longer take blame for any actions or free choice 
they make?”165  Other comments revealed the sheer disgust with the 
judicial system: “Sounds like another self serving ruling by our court 
system.  [T]he more we are allowed to sue the more the lawyers 
make.”166  One commentator faulted the fact that New Jersey Supreme 
 
 159. Since its inception in 1980, MADD now commands a presence in all 50 states, boasting more 
than 300 chapters and 1,200 victim advocates.  Additionally, MADD leaders have testified in front of 
Senate subcommittees regarding highway safety initiatives.  MADD has also filed key amicus curie 
briefs to the U.S. Supreme Court that helped to uphold the federal drinking age and establish the 
constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints.  See generally MADD, http://www.madd.org/ (last visited Apr. 
2, 2012). 
 160. Voss, 992 A.2d at 836. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Public Weigh-In on Voss v. Tranquilino, LAWSUIT REFORM WATCH.  (June 3, 2011), 
http://www.lawsuitreformwatch.org/2011/06/public-weigh-in-on-voss-v-tranquilino.html. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id.  One journalist noted that the problem of a litigious society was especially prevalent in 
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Court Justices are appointed by the governor.  In states where the 
justices are subject to election, “you don’t see too many . . . judges 
acting like legislators . . . or otherwise reaching idiotic decisions as they 
did in [Voss].” 167  Although these quoted passages are not scientifically 
indicative of the entire New Jersey populace, this informal public 
weigh-in does reveal the citizenry’s rightful concern with the Voss 
decision.  In an age when most people do not pay attention to cases 
decided by state supreme courts—let alone publicly discuss such 
decisions—the outrage is especially notable. 
Beyond mere online bloggers, the Voss decision also attracted the 
attention of the General Assembly of New Jersey.168  Ironically, the 
legislature sought to repeal the very decision that the New Jersey 
Supreme Court claimed was firmly grounded in legislative intent.169  
Led by Assemblyman John Amodeo and the tort-reform organization 
New Jersey Lawsuit Reform Alliance (NJLRA), the campaign to 
overturn Voss came less than one month after the case was affirmed by 
the state supreme court.170  In a statement supporting A-4228, the new 
legislation, NJLRA explained: 
Common sense is being downgraded to the point where drunk drivers can 
relinquish  personal responsibility by collecting monetary damages 
from the restaurateur serving  them drinks.  This decision was a kick in 
the gut to New Jersey’s restaurateurs.  A-4228 is a first step toward 
protecting our business community from the Supreme Court’s 
misinterpretation of the law.171 
Despite the fact that no one had publicly opposed the bill, A-4228 died 
when the legislative session ended on January 2, 2012.172  Mr. Amodeo 
has recently reintroduced the bill as A-2459, but no further action has 
 
New Jersey, earning the garden state “a national reputation as a lawsuit magnet.”  As the journalist 
explained, due to New Jersey’s plaintiff-friendly laws, “93 percent of the plaintiffs suing pharmaceutical 
companies in New Jersey in large class actions are from outside of the state . . . One in five small 
businesses in New Jersey, many with fewer than ten employees, report that they have been sued in the 
last few years as well.”  Marcus Rayner, Stop Legalized Extortion: Op-Ed: Drunken Motorist Shouldn’t 
Be Able to Sue for His Injuries in NJ, N.J. LAWSUIT REFORM ALLIANCE  (June 29, 2011), 
http://www.njlra.org/news.php?newsid=48. 
 167. Public Weigh-In on Voss v. Tranquilino, LAWSUIT REFORM WATCH (June 3, 2011), 
http://www.lawsuitreformwatch.org/2011/06/public-weigh-in-on-voss-v-tranquilino.html. 
 168. Legislation to Overturn Voss v. Tranquilino Decision Introduced, LAWSUIT REFORM WATCH 
(June 30, 2011), http://www.lawsuitreformwatch.org/2011/06/legislation-to-overturn-voss-v-
tranquilino-decision-introduced.html. 
 169. See id. 
 170. Id.  The Supreme Court of New Jersey decided the case on June 1, 2011.  The legislation to 
repeal the case was introduced on June 30, 2011. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Cf. H.R. 2459, 215th Gen. Assemb. (N.J. 2012). 
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yet been taken.173 
Even before the introduction of A-4228, the legislative goal of 
curbing drunk driving was apparent.174  For example, N.J.S.A. 39:4-
50(a) increased the penalties and broadened the class of people who may 
be liable for driving while intoxicated.175  The reformed law allows even 
a sober person to be found guilty of DWI if that person permitted an 
intoxicated individual to drive.176  Similarly, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.6(b)(3) 
expanded the class of people potentially facing alcohol-related liability 
by establishing social-host liability, or liability for non-licensed alcohol 
providers.177  N.J.S.A. 36:2-98 declared New Jersey a “HERO 
Campaign state,” meaning the state undertook the effort to raise 
awareness of the dangers of drunk driving and simultaneously promote 
the use of sober, designated drivers.178  “The Drunk Driving Victim’s 
Bill of Rights,” codified in N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.9 to 50.13, marks an 
extensive effort to explain to victims of drunk driving what type of 
recourse they are entitled to.179  Finally, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.17 permits 
courts to impose the additional penalty of requiring a convicted drunk 
driver to install an interlock device on his car to ensure sober driving.180  
Each of these statutes serves as a reminder that the legislature is faced 
with the task of determining the pressing social needs of the day and 
legislating accordingly.  In this way, the pre-existing legislation should 
have alerted the Voss court to the direction of public policy—a direction 
that certainly did not indicate a willingness to allow drunk drivers to 
recover under the Dram Shop Act. 
The immediate public outcry and legislative response reveal that the 
New Jersey Supreme Court chose the wrong method to enforce the 
public policy of deterring drunk driving.  Instead of holding the 
establishments accountable to the drunk driver himself, the court should 
have held the drunk driver accountable to the public that he was 
endangering.  This could have been accomplished by refusing to allow 
 
 173. H.R. 2459, 215th Gen. Assemb. (N.J. 2012).  The statement to the bill explains in 
unambiguous terms, “This bill is intended to reverse the Vossdecision by explicitly stating in the dram 
shop law that intoxicated drivers, as well as passengers who know they are driving with an intoxicated 
driver, are prohibited from bringing a dram shop claim against servers of alcoholic beverages.” 
 174. See generally, Voss v. Tranquilino, 19 A.3d 470, 473 (N.J. 2011) (Albin, J., dissenting) 
(explaining that N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(b) “is just one in a series of laws passed by the Legislature aimed at 
reducing the carnage caused on our highways by drunk drivers”). 
 175. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50(a) (2010). 
 176. Id. 
 177. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.6 (1988). 
 178. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 36:2-98 (2007).  See also HERO CAMPAIGN, 
http://www.herocampaign.org/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2012) (encouraging, “Be a hero.  Be a designated 
driver”). 
 179. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50.9-50.13 (1985). 
 180. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50.17 (2010). 
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the drunk driver any type of recovery.  In this regard, the approach taken 
by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Smith v. The 10th Inning is 
instructive.181  There, the court refused to allow an intoxicated patron to 
recover when his injury was the result of his own intoxication.182  The 
court could have adopted a comparative negligence approach—that is, 
submitting to the jury the issue of the patron’s fault compared to the 
serving establishment’s fault—but the court expressly declined to do 
so.183  As the court explained, such an approach would result in a 
puzzling “‘chicken or egg’ question: Is the permit holder who 
admittedly has experience in knowing the predilections and capacities of 
his or her customers more negligent or blameworthy than the intoxicated 
patron who is clever enough to mask his or her own intoxication in order 
to be served another drink?”184  The court rejected this nebulous 
weighing test and instead opted for a bright-line rule barring a 
voluntarily intoxicated individual from seeking any type of dram shop 
recovery. 
The Smith court found support for this bright-line rule in 
“commonsense public policy; namely, that an adult who is permitted to 
drink alcohol must be the one who is primarily responsible for his or her 
own behavior and resulting voluntary actions.”185  In a litigious society 
where people always want someone to blame, someone to sue—and 
preferably someone with deep pockets—this approach reinserts 
“personal” in “personal responsibility.” 
Relatedly, the Smith court considered judicial integrity—a value 
completely overlooked by the Voss court.186  As the Smith court 
explained, allowing a drunk driver to recover for his self-inflicted 
injuries 
would simply send the wrong message to all our citizens, because such a 
message would essentially state that a patron . . . may drink such alcohol 
with unbridled, unfettered impunity and with full knowledge that the 
permit holder will be ultimately responsible for any harm caused by the 
patron’s intoxication.187 
Thus, the Supreme Court of Ohio rightfully anticipated the very same 
arguments that the New Jersey populace leveled against its highest 
court. 
 
 181. Smith v. 10th Inning, Inc., 551 N.E.2d 1296 (Ohio 1990). 
 182. Id. at 1297. 
 183. Id. at 1298. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Courts and legislatures have come to recognize the acceptable social 
uses of alcohol while simultaneously realizing the need to regulate the 
substance.  Dram shop liability is one means by which the legislature 
can effect this regulation.  Although there is no single dram shop 
formula that is agreed to be “the best,” some approaches have proved 
more workable and logical than others.  The approach taken by the Voss 
court is one that should be repealed and never again repeated.  For each 
of the Voss court’s arguments, there is a stronger counterargument that 
the court completely ignored.  In the first place, the court’s willingness 
to limit post-dram shop legislation as applying exclusively to the 
insurance realm amounts to a subterfuge since the clear intent of the 
relevant post-dram shop law was to ensure that drunk drivers have no 
cause of action for recovery of loss sustained as a result of the accident.  
The court’s arrival at the opposite conclusion poses serious problems for 
future issues of statutory construction, as now New Jersey courts will be 
able to overlook the plain text of a statute even when that statute is 
facially unambiguous. 
Yet perhaps the most offensive aspect of Voss was the court’s 
audacious claim that its decision was “bolstered by a public policy 
consideration” of discouraging drunk driving.188  The immediate public 
outcry and the urgent legislative attempts to repeal the decision 
demonstrate that the court was severely mistaken in gauging public 
policy.  Indeed, as the post-Voss public sphere dialogue reveals, as 
between a voluntarily intoxicated individual and the serving 
establishment, society prefers blame to rest with the former.  In holding 
otherwise, the Supreme Court of New Jersey effectively implemented a 
policy of “grab a drink and pass the blame.”189  The backlash that 
ensued reveals the illusory nature of the court’s “public policy” rationale 
and just how out of touch the court it is with its constituents. 
Fortunately, Voss is the minority approach to dram shop liability.190  
Most jurisdictions abide by the far superior rule that the voluntarily 
intoxicated individual cannot recover for what essentially amounts to 
self-inflicted injuries.191  This approach, as the Supreme Court of Ohio 
in Smith explained, coalesces with common sense, public policy,192 and, 
 
 188. Voss v. Tranquilino, 992 A.2d 829, 836 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010). 
 189. This phrase was borrowed from Richard M. Scherer, Jr., Grab a Drink and Pass the Blame: 
An Argument Against Social Host Liability, 77 DEF. COUNS. J. 238 (2010). 
 190. See Richard Smith, A Comparative Analysis of Dramshop Liability and a Proposal for 
Uniform Legislation, 25 J. CORP. L. 553, 563–64 (2000). 
 191. Id. 
 192. Smith v. 10th Inning, Inc., 551 N.E.2d 1296, 1298 (Ohio 1990). 
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in the case of New Jersey, the legislative text itself.193  Furthermore, 
such an approach restores personal responsibility, judicial integrity, and 
society’s sense of security.  Indeed, the most basic argument against 
Voss is essentially one of self-preservation: in allowing the drunk driver 
to recover from the establishment that over-served him, drunk drivers 
have no disincentive to abandon their destructive practices.  In fact, the 
instances of drunk driving are likely to increase post-Voss.  Such an 
undesirable result is completely preventable by abandoning the Voss
decision and adopting a rule that bars the voluntarily intoxicated 
individual from bringing a dram shop action. 
Yet repealing Voss alone does not go far enough.  The social and 
public policy rationales for barring the drunk driver from recovery 
likewise extend to the passenger who knowingly and voluntarily enters a 
vehicle with an obviously intoxicated driver.  A contrary rule would 
encourage instances of drunk driving, as passengers—wanting to go 
home or change venues, but unwilling or unable to find alternate 
transportation—may goad the driver into believing that he is not that 
drunk, that he will not get caught, or that he drives better with a buzz.  
New Jersey legislators have recognized the need to discourage this 
culture of negligent passengering, and thus the proposed legislation to 
repeal Voss also includes language that bars the passengers from 
recovery.194  Although this is a commendable effort to limit the class of 
people who can bring a dram shop action, the proposed legislation is 
silent regarding another class of individuals: voluntarily intoxicated 
underage adults.195  These individuals should be treated no differently 
than any other adult for purposes of dram shop liability.  Indeed, as the 
Supreme Court of Ohio recognized in Klever, there is no convincing 
reason to allow a 20-year-old to sue a drinking establishment, but then 
bar a 21-year-old from doing the same.196  In order to show that the 
zero-tolerance policy regarding voluntary intoxication is not an empty 
threat, this class should likewise be barred from recovery.  In this way, 
repealing Voss is a step in the right direction, but it is not the final step 
in restoring the rationales of dram shop liability. 
Despite the aberrant and counterintuitive nature of the Vossdecision, 
the case has had one positive consequence: raising awareness of dram 
 
 193. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-4.5(b) (2003). 
 194. See H.R. 2459, 215th Gen. Assemb. (N.J. 2012) (declaring, “a person who rides in a motor 
vehicle which the person knows is operated by an intoxicated person and who sustains personal injury or 
property damage as a result of a motor vehicle accident shall be prohibited from instituting a civil action 
for damages against a licensed alcoholic beverage server”). 
 195. For purposes of dram shop liability, an “underage adult” should be distinguished from 
“minor,” as the former has attained the age of majority (18), but not the legal drinking age (21).  This 
Comment does not opine on the appropriateness of allowing minors to bring dram shop actions. 
 196. Cf. Klever v. Canton Sachsenheim, Inc., 715 N.E.2d 536 (Ohio 1999). 
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shop acts.  In an age where most people have never heard of this type of 
liability, the backwards Voss decision finally drew attention to the issue 
and engaged citizens in meaningful discourse.  If the conversation 
continues at this trajectory, soon the New Jersey populace and 
legislature alike will unite in the political process in an effort to repeal 
the Voss decision.  The proposed bill to do so recognizes, much like the 
Supreme Court of Ohio in Smith, that the rationales of dram shop 
liability contemplate recovery benefiting an injured third party, not a 
voluntarily intoxicated individual.  This reasoning is supported by the 
plain text of New Jersey’s Dram Shop Act, as well as public policy 
considerations.  In this way, the issue presented in Voss is far from being 
settled.  Hope remains that good law and common sense will be 
restored. 
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